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Abstract

California’s juvenile crime rate is high. Juveniles commit one-in-six violent crimes and
over one-quarter of all property crimes; they also commit crimes in school, victimizing
one-quarter of all students and one-in-twelve teachers. The economic loss from
juvenile crime is substantial. In total, each juvenile cohort in California imposes an
economic loss of $8.9 billion on the state’s citizens. Part of the explanation for juvenile
crime is poor education. In this paper, we estimate the economic loss from juvenile
crime associated with not completing high school before age 18. Using results from
three separate studies and applying their results for California, we estimate the annual
juvenile crime loss associated with high school dropouts at $1.1 billion. Finally, we
compare the losses from juvenile crime with the costs of improving the education
system. We calculate that savings in juvenile crime alone will offset approximately 16%
of the costs of providing these interventions.
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comments from Russ Rumberger and a reviewer.

1. Introduction
The negative social and economic losses for the State of California from the low
educational attainment of its citizens are substantial. Tax revenues are reduced and
government spending on health, crime, and welfare is elevated, increasing the fiscal
burden for all Californians. In earlier work, we found that as an adult each new high
school graduate, compared to a high school dropout, generates a substantial net fiscal
benefit for the taxpayer. After deducting the public cost of the additional investment in
keeping students in school until graduation, each additional high school graduate
contributes net fiscal benefits of $115,300 (lifetime benefits in present value at age 20)
to the federal government, and $53,600 to California’s state and local governments.
The social gains for California are even greater: inducing a potential high school dropout
to graduate generates a present value social gain to the state of up to $392,000
(Belfield and Levin, 2007a; 2006 dollars). 1
One significant component of the fiscal and social costs of low education is the
higher rate of criminal activity: for example, high school dropouts make up
approximately two-thirds of all prison inmates (Harlow, 2003). Specifically, we
estimated that each new high school graduate generates savings of $31,800 to the
criminal justice system and reduces social/victim costs of crime by $79,900. Thus,
investments in educational programs might be justified purely as crime prevention
strategies.

1 The social gain from education counts both the private gains (higher earnings, better health) and the societal gains (higher tax
payments, lower Medicaid/Medicare expenditures, lower criminal justice system expenditures, and lower welfare expenditures).
The present value expression is necessary because the gains from education accrue over a lifetime; all these gains are
translated in present values, i.e. into values ‘as if’ that amount of money was available now in the form of a certifiable deposit.
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However, even these figures are understatements of the full costs of inadequate
education. They exclude any impact of education on criminal activity before the age of
20, i.e., they do not count any juvenile crime or any crime by those aged 18-19.
Juvenile crime is a large proportion of all crime committed in the State. In
California in 2007, juveniles were arrested for one-in-six violent crimes and over onequarter of all property crimes (NCJJ, 2008). Juveniles also commit crimes in school:
one-quarter of all students and 8% of teachers report some form of victimization over a
school year (national figures, Dinkes et al., 2007). Moreover, victims of juvenile crimes
are typically themselves young, imposing lifetime social and psychological costs.
Finally, given the well documented life-course patterns of escalating crime, juvenile
offenses are often the precursors to more severe, more frequent adult criminal activity.
The role of education in reducing the economic and social impacts of juvenile crime
would therefore seem to be an important area for investigation.
Poor quality education (crowded schools and dilapidated facilities, poorly paid or
uncertified teachers, ineffective school management systems) reduces achievement
and causes more students to drop out (Balfanz and Letgers, 2004). In turn, this is likely
to raise the juvenile crime rate. Our focus here is on the link between juvenile crime
and dropping out of school. Each juvenile cohort (ages 12-17) in California is 3.56
million persons, of which 819,500 (23%) will not complete high school. 2 Yet, a

This estimate is derived from Belfield and Levin (2007a, Table 3). Census population figures for each age range from 12 to 17
are weighted by graduation rates by sex and ethnicity (with a private school graduation rate of 95%). Our dropout rate of 23%
does not include those persons who graduate between the ages of 18 and 20: approximately 10% of all students graduate late.
So, the on-time graduation rate is 72%, not (as implied by a dropout rate of 23%) 77%. So, the estimate used here is
conservative in terms of the numbers of dropouts. However, it might be argued that students who graduate late exhibit behaviors
closer to those of on-time graduates than those of dropouts. Another way in which this estimate is conservative is that it counts
GED recipients as graduates. Although there is ample evidence that GED recipients are not comparable to graduates in terms of
earnings, there are no comparisons for criminal behavior. Moreover, a high proportion of GEDs are obtained by incarcerated
2

2

proportion of these ‘future dropouts’ would be capable of graduating if they received a
high quality education; and along with all the private economic benefits of graduation,
these individuals would also commit fewer juvenile crimes. Thus, a low quality
education system is expensive to the state of California in that it raises the rate of
juvenile offending across almost one million juveniles.
This paper calculates the economic loss to the state of California from juvenile
crime and related, subsequent adult crime as a consequence of low education. Our
primary effort is to provide new and detailed estimates for juvenile crime, but we also
calculate the economic loss by young adults (ages 18-19) and add in estimates of adult
crime (ages 20 onward); these figures for adults are extrapolations from our earlier work
on adult crime in California (Belfield and Levin, 2007a).
The paper is structured as follows. We begin with a review of juvenile crime and
justice in California. We document the extent of crime and the characteristics of its
perpetrators; and we draw attention to important concerns for analyzing its impacts. In
Section 3, we describe the costs of juvenile crime. We use both research evidence and
budget data for California to calculate costs per crime and per juvenile criminal. In
Section 4, we identify the size of the relationship between education and juvenile crime.
In Section 5, we calculate the total costs of juvenile crime which are associated with the
proportions of youth who drop out of high school, i.e., we add up all the juvenile crime
committed by dropouts, including those crimes committed before they dropped out. We
add to this calculation the costs of young adult crime and adult crime again insofar as
these are associated with low education. In Section 6, we consider potential

persons, complicating the relationship between GED status and crime. Nevertheless, if GED recipients have crime rates
equivalent to those of dropouts, then the relevant number rises by almost one-third from 819,500 to 1.105 million.
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interventions that might reduce the rate of juvenile offending by raising graduation rates
and whether these pass an economic test. Section 7 considers policy options to reduce
the rate of juvenile crime by improving educational quality in California.

2. Juvenile Crime in California
The first column of Table 1 shows the extent of juvenile crime in California based on FBI
arrest data. In 2007, there were 233,588 arrests of juveniles (ages 10-17) out of a
population of 4.49 million (Hill, 2007). Of all arrests, 27% were felonies, 60%
misdemeanors, and 13% were status offenses (i.e., crimes specific to juveniles). 3
Across the juvenile felony arrests, 40% were for property crimes; 25% for violent crimes;
10% for drugs offenses; and 25% for others (including firearms possession). There
were 170 homicide cases involving juvenile perpetrators.
The types of crimes juveniles commit differ somewhat from those by adults.
Juvenile crimes are more likely to be related to drug use, gun violence, gang activity,
alcohol abuse, and possibly sexual assault (see respectively Russell et al. [2008];
Watkins et al. [2008]; Decker et al. [2008]; Ford [2005]; and Woodhams et al. [2007]).
The second column of Table 1 shows the proportion of all arrests in California where the
arrestee is a juvenile. Overall, juveniles are arrested for one-in-six violent crimes and
over one-quarter of all property crimes. They represent one-in-seven disorderly arrests,
more than one-half of all arsons, and almost one-half of all vandalism arrests. However,
Welsh et al. (2008) find that juvenile assaults may be more severe than adult assaults,
and sentences for juveniles in California have trended toward those of adults (NCJJ,
3 Juvenile crime is processed differently from adult crime. Juveniles who are arrested are categorized as: informal probationers
(for minor offenses); status offenders; criminal offenders (adjudicated in criminal court); and ‘remands’ to superior court (for
severe crimes). Therefore, some minor offenses may not be processed formally through the criminal justice system.
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2008). Thus, although the types of crimes committed by juveniles may differ from those
of adults, they are of no lesser significance.
But these proportions understate the significance of juvenile crime, not least
because juveniles are tallied in comparison with those with a much more extensive
range of ages (adulthood) and because juveniles will “age out” (unless they are arrested
promptly when they begin their infractions). First, juveniles often have contact with the
police prior to arrest through informal probation or warnings, thus avoiding the official
statistics. Second, violations in school should also be added to these FBI statistics.
During the school year 2007-08, California’s public schools reported approximately
130,000 violent incidents, almost 6,000 serious violent incidents, and 70,000 other
incidents; these are incident rates of 2.8, 0.1, and 1.5 per 100 students (Neiman and
DeVoe, 2009, Table 1). In addition, many schools report delinquent behavior such as:
student racial/ethnic tensions; bullying; sexual harassment; abuse of teachers; class
disorder; and gang activities (Neiman and DeVoe, 2009). Many of these activities are
not prosecuted through the formal criminal justice system (e.g., juvenile gang activity,
see Rainone et al., 2006). Third, victims of juvenile crimes are typically themselves
juveniles, imposing on them a lifetime of social and psychological costs. And finally,
criminal activity typically peaks at ages 18-19 with many studies establishing a lifecourse pattern of crime (Delisi and Gatling, 2003). Thus, juvenile crime—substantial in
and of itself—is often a precursor of further criminal activity of increasing severity.
Three significant individual characteristics of juvenile criminals stand out. First,
most juvenile criminal activity is performed by males (Tracy et al., 2009; Johansson and
Kempf-Leonard, 2009; Martin et al., 2008). Three-quarters of juvenile arrests in
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California are of males (Hill, 2007). Also, males disproportionately commit the more
serious crimes: nationally, more than 80% of felony arrests and 93% of youth homicide
suspects are male (Cook and Laub, 2002). Consequently, 95% of the population that is
institutionalized by the Department of Juvenile Justice in California are male (CJSC,
2008).
Second, juvenile crime rates increase across their age range (Gottfredson and
Soule, 2005). In California, 2% of arrests are for juveniles aged 10-11; 27% aged 1214; and 71% aged 15-17 (Hill, 2007). However, initial criminal activity predominates at
ages 13-15 (Welsh et al., 2008). Third, Black juveniles are arrested disproportionately
to their populations (Bellair and McNulty, 2005). In California, Black juveniles account
for 17% of all arrests although they are only 8% of the youth population. 4 White and
other race groups are arrested at rates lower than their populations, with Hispanics
about proportionate, accounting for 46% of the youth population and 48% of juvenile
arrests (Hill, 2007).
Juvenile arrests lead to prosecution through the criminal juvenile justice system.
From the total arrests in 2007, there were 189,700 direct referrals to probation as well
as another 13,800 cases referred from other agencies. Of these 203,500 probation
dispositions, 36% were closed at intake (i.e., dismissed), 6% were placed in diversion
programs, 5% were transferred to other government agencies, and 3% were placed on
informal probation. The remainder were disposed to adult court (0.4% of the total, 700
cases) or juvenile court (50%, 101,800 cases). Of the adult court cases, 81% were
convicted. Of the 101,800 juvenile cases, there were 61,600 wardships, 8,700

The racial composition of the California Department of Juvenile Justice is even more polarized: as of 2008, 56% were Hispanic,
30% African American, and 10% were White (CA Juvenile Research Branch).
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diversions, and 10,500 non-ward or informal probations, and 19,400 cases dismissed
(data from CSJC, 2008). 5
Of the wardships, 58% were placed in (their) own or (a) relative’s home, 29%
(17,600 persons) were housed in a secure county facility, and 14% were housed in an
alternative facility. 6 These facilities include: detention centers (23%); shelters (6%);
reception/diagnosis centers (3%); group homes (27%); boot/ranch camps (6%); training
schools (7%); and residential treatment camps (29%). For those placed in a state
facility, the average length of stay is 26 months, with an additional 40 months on parole.
County placements are shorter: the median durations for community supervision are 5-9
months, for county placements are one year, and for county custodial sentences 1-4.5
months. 7
There are three key concerns in analyzing (juvenile) crime. The first is the
‘offense multiple’, i.e., the number of crimes relative to arrests. Because many crimes—
particularly minor ones—are not reported and many are not resolved, the arrest rate is
only a fraction of total criminal activity. Based on comparisons of court records and selfreports from the Seattle Social Development Youth Study, Farrington et al. (2003)
estimate large offense multiples. For example, the offense multiples are as high as six
for crimes such as rape, assault, larceny and arson, i.e., for every one arrest for arson
there will have been five other acts of arson committed within the same period. Of
course, the offense multiples for juveniles are much greater if the subsequent adult
Wards are juveniles who are the responsibility of the court but may be placed ‘at home’ or in a secure facility; diversions are
juveniles allocated to alternative rehabilitative programs or services; and informal probations are juveniles monitored typically in
an unrestricted setting.
6 Although in most states offenders who are sentenced beyond age 18 are transferred to adult correctional facilities, in California
the Division of Juvenile Justice retains offenders until age 25. California has an extended age up to 24 for juvenile jurisdiction,
with juvenile court jurisdiction up to age 21 (NCJJ, 2008).
7 State facilities durations from California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice website.
County durations from Hennigan et al. (2007, Table 10a).
5
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crimes are included. 8 A second concern is that a small subset of criminals undertakes a
large fraction of all crimes. Cohen and Piquero (2009) estimate that 6% of criminals
(‘chronic offenders’) commit almost half of all crimes (for Black males, see Merlo and
Wolpin, 2009).
The third concern is the extent to which early juvenile crime predicts later juvenile
and adult crime. Many juvenile criminals may be ‘experimenting’ during adolescence
and a first misdemeanor may not connote the extent of future criminal activity.
However, juvenile crime is a very strong predictor of subsequent crime: not only
because of underlying circumstances but also because of social labeling of early
offenders as delinquents (Bernburg and Krohn, 2003). The correlation between juvenile
offending and adult offending is very high (Delisi and Gatling, 2003; Ramchand et al.,
2009). Therefore, a salient consideration in calculating the economic losses is the
‘induced’ adult crime that juvenile criminals commit.
Finally, historical patterns of juvenile crime are pertinent. Over the last decade,
youth violence has dropped from its peak in 1993 (Cook and Laub, 2002). In California,
even as the youth population has grown significantly, the absolute number of felony
arrests has decreased significantly. Incarcerated populations have fallen accordingly: in
1999, there were 19,000 offenders in youth correctional facilities compared to 14,000 in
2005. Moreover, youth crime may have fallen faster than adult crime: juvenile and adult
felony arrest rates were approximately equal in 1995 (at just under 2.5% of the
respective populations); by 2005, the juvenile felony arrest rate was 1.3% compared to
2% for adults.

Moreover, these analyses do not include the links between crime and suicide. Both victims of crime and perpetrators of crimes
(especially drugs and gun-related crimes) are more likely to commit suicide (Cutler et al., 2001).
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However, national data indicates that younger violent offenders have grown
substantially in relation to other age groups: whereas in 1982 43% of homicides were by
persons aged under 25, by 1998 the proportion was 60% (Cook and Laub, 2002).
Although correctional facilities house fewer juvenile criminals, many juvenile offenders
may now receive alternative services (such as group homes). 9 Also, crime rates are
typically counter-cyclical with economic growth: declining crime rates over the past
decade were in part a function of the high growth rate of income or gross domestic
product (GDP), and, presumably better economic opportunities for youth.

3. Cost Estimates of Juvenile Crime
3.1 Crime Cost Items
We now turn to the economic loss imposed by crime in California. We include burdens
imposed on fiscal agencies (state and federal governments) and society. 10 Where
available, we use California-specific data. Nationally, California ranks in the middle in
its overall adult correctional control rate (percentage of the adult population incarcerated
or on probation or parole). But, in spending on corrections as a proportion of general
funds, the state ranks fifth (Pew Center on the States, 2009).
There are four main costs to government (Anderson, 1999): (1) costs of
operating the criminal justice system (CJS) for policing and for trials and sentencing; (2)
costs for incarceration, including parole and probation; (3) costs to the state from
restitution for victims, from medical care, and from lost tax revenues (both from victims

9 Also, homicide incidences have become more dispersed geographically in that large cities no longer have higher murder rates.
A more ‘even’ spread of homicide rates is likely to raise the costs of avoidance as all citizens are at risk.
10 We assume that California contributes funds for federal crime prevention proportionate to its size in the U.S. economy. We
also assume that all crimes are committed in-state.
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and perpetrators); and (4) costs of government crime prevention agencies (e.g.,
budgets for DHS, DEA, ATF). A fifth cost which is not often mentioned is the marginal
excess tax burden (or deadweight loss) associated with collecting revenues to provide
government services. However, because of data limitations, these fiscal costs are
typically limited to information from two categories: CJS costs and incarceration costs.
The social loss associated with crime includes several other elements beyond
the fiscal ones. It includes: the costs directly imposed on victims; transfers of assets
from victims to criminals; avoidance costs by potential victims (including insurance
claims); and productivity losses from participating in criminal activity rather than work.
Again, because of data limitations, these social costs are typically reduced to direct
victim costs in the form of missed work, medical expenses, and lower quality of life.
If the costs of crime and delinquency within schools are included, we should also
add on two fiscal costs: the costs of crime prevention to the school and the added costs
of compensation to attract teachers to dangerous school environments; and one large
social cost: the costs in disruption to learning for student victims and classmates.
These may be substantial. For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District has
over 430 personnel in its School Police Department; many of these positions are
administrative, but some are for school safety officers, and others for personnel trained
as full police officers. 11 Adjusting for teacher quality, teachers who work in more
dangerous schools will require additional pay to compensate for the danger. Also, there
is strong evidence of disruptive peer effects: many studies have identified adverse
academic effects on the victims of school violence, and that the effects are compounded
as the level of violence rises (Graham et al., 2006).
11

Website at www.laspd.com.
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For juvenile crime, the costs may be expressed in several dimensions. We
report the annual cost per cohort, i.e., the cost of crime committed by all juveniles (aged
12-17) in a given year. In addition, we report individual-level costs, both per youth and
per offender. For offenders, it is also useful to consider subsequent crime costs,
recognizing that juvenile crime strongly predicts adult crime and that juvenile crime may
entail incarceration during adulthood.
3.2 Prior Literature on the Costs of Juvenile Crime
Several studies for other states have calculated the costs of juvenile crime. 12 Data from
each source is adjusted to account for California prices and express figures in 2008
dollars with a factor accounting for the relatively high rate of inflation of criminal justice
services. We also adjust each source to account for the relative crime rate in California
using FBI data. (In other respects, we are assuming that where we lack specific data
for California, the national data correspond to the California context).
Fass and Pi (2002) report CJS unit costs of juvenile crimes in Texas. These
costs—policing, screening, detention, intake assessment, court activity, and
supervision, but not incarceration—vary depending on the treatment of the offender.
Adjusted for California costs for these functions, the CJS costs per case are: $1,400 for
deferred prosecution cases; $9,300 for probationary cases; $13,300 for intensive
supervision; and $13,000 for local placement.

Many of these sources (including Aos et al., 2006; Fass and Pi, 2002) rely on primary evidence from Miller et al. (1996) for
victim costs.
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In their direct investigation of juvenile violence in Pennsylvania in 1993, Miller et
al. (2001) estimated 93,900 violent crimes by juveniles, leading to 5,133 referrals. 13
Adjusted for the context in California, this estimate of juvenile violence would translate
into a fiscal cost of $400 million, not counting any costs to the criminal justice system.
Miller et al. (2001) also estimated the social costs to victims of juvenile crime in terms of
medical care, public programs, lost future earnings, property losses, and quality of life.
Adjusted for California, these social costs would be $14.1 billion. Not counting other
crimes, these estimates suggest that juvenile violence alone might impose costs for the
state of California of approximately $14.5 billion.
Other literature has focused on the lifetime victim costs of career criminals or
chronic offenders. Based on a sample of 503 boys in Philadelphia, Welsh et al. (2008)
calculate the costs of a juvenile cohort (aged 7-17) using victim costs derived from Miller
et al. (1996). Each juvenile imposes present value costs of $210,000 during the juvenile
years, with early onset offenders imposing much higher victim costs (2% discount rate).
However, these costs do not include CJS costs; and the sample is urban males, with a
disproportionate weighting of at-risk youth. Also, the pattern of juvenile crime reported
by Welsh et al. (2008, Table 2) does not correspond to the arrest data in California
given in Table 1. 14 A fuller estimate is given by Cohen and Piquero (2009) using
willingness-to-pay measures for avoiding crime. Assuming that juvenile crime leads to
adult crime, Cohen and Piquero (2009) calculate that the lifetime present value crime

Adopting a per crime type approach allows for a disaggregated costing method, with more transparent assumptions and more
rigorous sensitivity analysis. Using aggregate measures has the advantage that all costs may be accounted for, but the
disadvantage that costs and crimes cannot be directly related.
14 Based on records of serial offenders in Texas, Delisi and Gatling (2003) estimate that the average career criminal imposes
$1.11 million in victim costs and $360,000 in CJS costs over the life course. It is not clear that this is a present value. Also,
because it is based on retrospective information from adult serial offenders, it may not include all juvenile crime.
13
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burden imposed by a high-risk 14-year-old is $2.6-$5.3 million (assuming a 2% discount
rate). Of this total social burden, $930,000 arises from juvenile crime. However,
because both these studies focus on high-risk youth, estimates for an entire cohort
cannot easily be projected.
In light of these estimates and the data limitations, our approach is to use the
CJS and incarceration costs from budgetary expenditures in California and to use
adjusted victim costs from Miller et al. (1996). In addition, we include school-site costs
of juvenile crime based on expenditures by the California Department of Education.
3.3 Budgetary Spending on Juvenile Justice in California
Budgeted spending on juvenile crime is primarily composed of spending on policing, the
criminal justice system, and corrections. In California, annual state spending on policing
is $13.3 billion, and spending on the judicial branch and department of justice is an
additional $4.75 billion (LAO, 2009; Pew Center on the States, 2009). This covers all
crimes, adult and juvenile. If we assume that juvenile crime is 10% of the total amount,
then the state fiscal loss (in policing and CJS) of juvenile crime is $1.8 billion (this is an
understatement because it does not include federal agencies or other state agencies
that may play a law enforcement role, nor does it include independent rehabilitation,
remedial, and support programs which may be offered to juveniles). 15
County CJS spending on juveniles is also significant. However, county financial
statements itemize expenditures under a general label of ‘public protection’, without
separating out spending on juvenile and adult crime. Also, a substantial proportion of
county spending is funded by federal and state transfers. To estimate county spending
15 It is also possibly an understatement because juveniles commit 15% of crimes, not 10%. However, juveniles do not commit
crimes as severe as adults, or in some cases are not prosecuted as intensively, so the incidence rate is not a perfect guide to the
cost implications.
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on budgetary data we review the financial statements of seven large counties. 16 These
counties comprise 63% of the state population, but 76% of the state’s crime, so we
weight their expenditures accordingly to obtain total county-level spending on public
protection. In 2008, we estimate that county-level spending on public protection was
$13.2 billion. However, on average across the seven counties, 35% of this spending is
appropriated from federal and state transfers. Assuming again that juvenile crime is
10% of net county spending, the county fiscal loss (in policing and CJS) is $810 million.
For incarceration, Table 2 shows expenditures for fiscal 2007 by the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations (almost all of which is allotted through
general funds). Total annual expenditure is almost $10 billion, but the bulk of that is for
housing adult criminals. Juvenile corrections expenditures total $520 million annually:
this is composed of $208 million for operations, $178 million for support programs, $37
million for paroles, and $100 million for healthcare. 17 Strikingly, there are only 2,300
wards in the state juvenile corrections system. Thus, annually, these wards are costing
over $200,000 per person (Hill, 2007).
Also, as noted above, many juveniles are not incarcerated. Informal probationers
impose relatively light costs on the criminal justice system, but are often referred to
other public services, such as drug counseling or mental health programs. Status
offenders also impose relatively light costs in that they are referred to remedial
programs. Moreover, the facilities are likely to vary in unit cost: not only do they offer
Specifically, these counties are: Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Sacramento, San Francisco, Santa Clara, Orange County, and
Riverside. Spending in 2008 on public protection in these seven counties was $10 billion. We subtract 5% for expenditures on
items unrelated to juvenile crime (e.g., forestry protection). This total is under-estimated insofar as counties also spend a
proportion of their education budgets on crime prevention.
17 Similarly, our cost estimates are conservative because of the costs we omit. Some proportion of funding for the Correctional
Standards Authority should also be apportioned to spending on juvenile justice. In addition, the California Victim Compensation
and Government Claims Board expenditures are $150 million annually (VCP website financial statement). Also, there are funds
allocated through the Office for Victim and Survivor Services but these cannot be apportioned to victims of juvenile crimes.
16
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different services, but they vary in size and so vary in economies of scale (with
detention centers, reception centers and training schools being the largest, see Livesey
et al., 2009).
These estimates of total policing, CJS and incarceration expenditures in fiscal
2007 for California from juvenile crime are summarized in Table 3; based on current
estimates of expenditures, they amount to approximately $3.1 billion annually. An
alternative, partial estimate is reported in Fellmeth (2005, Table 9-F). It sums local law
enforcement responding to juvenile crime, juvenile prosecution and defense, juvenile
courts, and juvenile probation at $2.2 billion. Adding in our estimates of incarceration
spending raises the estimate to $2.7 billion (2003 dollars, adjusted to 2008). Another
alternative is to apply the unit costs reported in Fass and Pi (2002) to the incidence of
crime in California given in Section 2, whereby CJS spending in California would
amount to approximately $1.1 billion. Again, this does not account for incarceration, so
a comparable estimate including the criminal justice system costs would be $1.6 billion.
Weighting the Miller et al. (2001) estimates by the proportion of violent crimes out of
total felony crimes, we estimate that the fiscal costs of juvenile crime are at least $1.1
billion. This is likely to be a significant understatement because it assumes that CJS
and incarceration costs are only for felonies. 18
3.4 Social Costs
A full accounting of the social costs of crime should include all the items listed in Section
3.1. However, because of a lack of directly available data, we apply the cost estimates

Also, it does not include the costs of therapeutic interventions such as drug and alcohol rehabilitation or anger management,
which are found in the budgets of other agencies.
18
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from Miller et al. (1996). 19 Below we show that this application is an understatement of
the total costs.
Social costs are a function of the amount of crime and not the number of arrests,
since only a small proportion of crime actually culminates in arrests. We therefore
weight the arrests by an appropriate vector of juvenile offense multiples, i.e., each arrest
is multiplied by the likely number of crimes committed but which did not lead to an
arrest. The only available offense multiples for juveniles are from Welsh et al. (2003).
However, these are based on youth residing in a high-crime area in Seattle
(Washington) and as such they are likely to overstate the offense multiple across the
general population. Therefore, we weight them by the proportions of high-crime areas.
This yields a set of offense multiples as reported in the first column of Table 4. For
example, for each arrest for curfew, there were in fact twice as many actual curfew
violations.
Table 4 reports the social (victim) costs per unit of crime and the total social
costs (number of crimes times unit cost) for fiscal 2007. The social costs of juvenile
crime in California are estimated at $5.28 billion. Almost one-half of these victim costs
are from assaults, and approximately one-seventh from sex offenses.
3.5 Costs of Crime and Delinquency in School
There is limited data on the costs of offenses (and general delinquency) committed in
school; therefore, estimates of these costs must be treated with caution. However, we
are not counting the cost that is probably the most significant: the costs in disruptions to
learning.
19 An alternative is to use estimates by Ludwig (2007) and Anderson (1999) of the relationship between the fiscal and social
burdens of crime. Specifically, the social cost of crime is 2.5-4 times as large as the fiscal burden. Based on discussions above
about the particular distinctiveness of juvenile crime, these proportions may not be appropriate.

16

On crime prevention and school safety, the most relevant calculation is taken
from Rothstein (1995), who estimated schools spend approximately 2-5% of their
budgets on these services. Adopting the lower figure, and applying it to students aged
12 and above in half of all schools, these school-site costs amount to $340 million. 20
On the costs to the state from paying higher wages to teachers to accept positions in
riskier situations (when teacher quality is accounted for), Belfield and Schwartz (2006)
calculate that, controlling for individual characteristics (including experience and
training), teachers are paid 1-4% more in schools with high rates of robbery/theft,
vandalism, or drug abuse. However, there is no robust calculation of the monetary
value lost by students attending schools with disruptive peers. Adopting the lower
figure, and applying it to students in sixth grade and above in half of all schools, these
additional wage payments amount to $110 million.
Conservatively, therefore, the costs of juvenile delinquency to the school system
in California are estimated at $450 million.
3.5 Costs per Crime and Criminal
Table 5 summarizes the total fiscal cost to the state from juvenile crime. The baseline
estimate is $8.9 billion, composed of victim costs (60%), fiscal costs (36%), and schoolsite costs (4%).
To check the robustness of this estimate, we derive 47 alternative combinations
of costs. These combinations either use figures reported above or apply different scalar
factors to each component: we vary victim costs, offense multiples, school security

20 There are 3.56 million students aged 12-17 in California (Census). Annual school spending in 2007 is $9,600 per student
(NCES, 2007). Therefore, 2% of this amount is $679.7 million. For the compensating wage differential, we estimate annual
spending on teachers at $6,600 per student. The cost is applied to half of all schools so as to bring these schools in line with the
average school in terms of safety (not in line with the safest school).
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costs, and the size of the compensating wage differentials (see Table 5 Notes). These
47 tests have an average somewhat lower than the baseline estimate; however, they
also yield a standard deviation of $1.4 billion. Therefore, our estimates of the fiscal and
victim costs of crime (in California) are estimated at $8.9 billion with a one standard
deviation confidence interval of +/-$1.38 billion.
From these costs it is possible to calculate the average annual costs per juvenile
and per juvenile offender. These costs are reported in the top panel of Table 6. Simply,
there are 3.56 million Californians aged 12-17; the costs per juvenile are therefore
$2,480 (= $8.9 billion / 3.56 million).
However, it is important to distinguish between males and females and between
offenders and non-offenders. Based on relative crime commission rates and population
sizes by sex, the average social loss is $4,140 per male juvenile and $760 per female
juvenile. According to tabulations from Merlo and Wolpin (2009) and Cohen and
Piquero (2008), the juvenile population may be divided into the 2% of chronic offenders
(who commit 50% of all crimes), 12% of occasional offenders, and 86% of nonoffenders. Applying this distribution, we estimate the cost per juvenile offender is
$10,350 and the cost per chronic offender is $62,110. Disaggregating the estimates by
sex, we calculate the annual cost per male juvenile chronic offender at $103,520.
An alternative expression is the present value loss per juvenile over the ages 12
through 17. These costs are reported in the bottom panel of Table 6. We apply a
discount rate of 3.5% (based on the consensus proposed by Moore et al., 2004).
Across the entire juvenile years, each individual imposes an economic loss of $14,680.
However, occasional offenders impose burdens over four times as large ($61,160) and
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chronic offenders over 25 times as large ($366,940). Adjusting for sex, we estimate that
a male chronic offender in California imposes a social loss of well in excess of half a
million dollars ($611,570). Moreover, this estimate does not include any crime-related
burden during adulthood. 21
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis of Crime Costs
The above estimates may be subject to measurement error: the typical or average costs
of crime are not easily calculated, in part, because they depend on an accurate count of
the offense multiple. 22 However, these costs are likely to be conservative: they are
considerably below those derived from research based on how much people are willing
to pay for a lower crime rate (Cohen et al., 2004). 23 Also, many of the components of
the full fiscal and social costs of crime are omitted because of data limitations.
Specifically, the victims’ costs in Miller et al. (1996) exclude avoidance costs, mental
health costs (including referrals to clinics or psychological counseling), long-term
disability costs, and hospital care paid by insurers, as well as omit any induced crime by
victims of crime (Cohen, 2005). They also do not include the deadweight loss from tax
collection to pay for public services to combat crime.
Furthermore, juvenile crime costs may not correspond to average costs across
all crimes. There are several reasons why juvenile crime may be more expensive than

21 Following earlier studies for purposes of comparability, we can also apply a 2% discount rate in reporting present values.
(Because of a lack of information, we cannot translate the figures in earlier studies into our preferred discount rate). For chronic
offenders, the present value burden per male offender is estimated at $625,300, which may be compared with the estimate of
$930,000 calculated by Cohen and Piquero (2008). The difference arises largely because we apply a lower offense multiple for
chronic offenders.
22 There are several empirical challenges to collecting costs data. First, there are few sources for costs, either at the aggregate,
per-crime, or per-criminal level. Also, a particular crime cannot be always be linked to a specific unit cost measure.
23 If, as estimated by Ludwig (2007) and Anderson (1999), the social cost of crime is 2.5 times as large as the fiscal burden, then
the annual social burden from juvenile crime is $11.4 billion for the state of California. Of course, this simple calculation does not
account for differences in the severity of crimes by juvenile status, in life-course effects, or in treatment by the justice system.
However, it is suggestive of the extent to which the figures in Table 5 are conservative.
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adult crime. Typically, economic valuations of quality of life costs vary inversely with the
victim’s age, so average estimates of the costs of a crime are understatements when
juveniles are the victims. Juvenile victims may receive more support from government
agencies, including social/victim services and mental health care agencies. Also,
because the processing of juvenile cases is at the county level, and each county must
develop and implement its own practices, there may be significant duplication of
resources. Conditional on incarceration, juvenile corrections costs may be higher than
those for the typical adult prisoner: all juveniles are now entitled to rehabilitative
treatment, leading to smaller units of incarceration and upgrading of existing units
(NCJJ, 2008). The burden of payment for defense may vary between adult and juvenile
crimes: in California, 90% of juvenile defenses are by court-appointed counsels or
public defenders (CJSC, 2008). Also, risk assessments are more common for juveniles
and after-care step-down programs may be more intensive during parole. In contrast,
one factor driving down costs is that juveniles are more likely to be treated informally
and—if adjudicated—placed in diversion programs rather than prisons. 24
Of course, any changes in criminal activity may not be fully reflected in spending.
The available data is expenditure data; these yield average costs per crime. We are not
able to estimate cost functions for crime and so cannot derive the marginal change in
expenditure for a given change in the crime rate. 25 For California, there is evidence that
expenditures and criminal activity are not perfectly correlated. Specifically, spending did
There are two methodological challenges in relating juvenile and adult crime costs. First, one of the costs to victims is lost
productivity measured in lost wages. But youth victims are not working, so the most sensible approach is to equate this cost in
terms of lost school days. For simplicity, we assume that lost productivity and lost school days are equal. Second, a fuller
measure of the costs of incarcerating juveniles is ‘willingness-to-pay’. However, Nagin et al. (2006) report that citizens put higher
values on rehabilitation rather than incarceration for juveniles. As such, expenditures on juvenile incarceration are an
understatement of the full costs.
25 Fass and Pi (2002) apply a marginal cost value equal to only 17.5% of average costs.
24
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not fall as fast as crime did: state expenditures on juvenile corrections fell by 22% in the
decade before 2006 (from $600 million to $470 million, 2006 dollars), but the ward
population fell by more than 70%. Ultimately, costs should fall as crime falls, but the
precise relationship cannot easily be predicted.
A last factor to consider is the rate of change of costs in the future. Total annual
state spending in California grew by 7% between 1996 and 2006; yet spending on the
criminal justice system grew by 10%. Notably, incarceration spending in California is
now twice as much as it was two decades ago (real dollars). One of the reasons is
healthcare of the incarcerated, which is now more extensive and costly, with spending
having doubled between 2000 and 2008 (NCJJ, 2008, Livsey et al., 2009). Another
reason is that staffing shortages lead to reliance on overtime payments to current staff.
Moreover, current spending in California does not fully reflect the new standards for
juvenile rehabilitation: Hill (2007) estimates the additional cost to provide a rehabilitative
model of corrections may be 25% more than is currently spent. Costs are also likely to
escalate as prison populations exceed their holding capacities. Thus, these
expenditures are likely to grow in the medium term.
Given these factors, it is likely that our estimate of $8.9 billion as the economic
loss from crime per juvenile cohort in California is very conservative. The figure is also
likely to grow as health care requirements for juvenile cohorts increase.
4. Link between Education and Juvenile Crime
Given the substantial losses as a result of juvenile crime, it is worthwhile to consider
whether educational reforms would be effective. The link between education and
juvenile crime is not easily established, not least because of the challenges in
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measuring and classifying the incidence of crime noted above. Even when crime is
accurately measured, there are many confounding influences, including: family
circumstances, such as household income; family characteristics, such as single
parenthood or whether a parent has been convicted of a crime; economic conditions
and youth labor market opportunities; and the effectiveness of policing and crime
prevention strategies. Many of these affect both the propensity to commit crime and to
drop out of school such that isolating a single chain of causality is difficult.
However, in their review, Farrington and Welsh (2007) emphasize low attainment
and cognitive scores as key determinants of juvenile crime. If education provision were
of a higher quality, then juvenile crime would be lower. 26
Better quality education (as reflected in high school graduation) is likely to reduce
juvenile crime by improving the ‘social bond’ with school (Sprott et al., 2005); possibly,
education is associated with psychological attributes such as social control or time
preference (Longshore et al., 2005; Wilson and Daly, 2006). This leads students to
have: greater attachment to school; increased commitment to the value of education;
and more acceptance of the authority of school. Also, attending school has a
straightforward effect on displacing the opportunity to commit crime, although this may
re-direct some crime to the school site. Potentially, the association between
educational quality and delinquency may not be linear. Educational quality may only
work in conjunction with other protective factors, may only influence lesser crimes, or it
may need to be of extremely high quality in order to have any effect. Finally, it is

Here, we exclude attainment of a GED as ‘better quality’: increasing the numbers of GED holders will mean a lower dropout
rate, but its implications for the juvenile crime rate are unclear.
26
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necessary to consider whether the causality is reversed, i.e., whether juvenile crime
itself causes low attainment.
For adults, the empirical association between more education and less crime is
strong (Farrington, 2003). 27 There is less evidence for juveniles, and the
methodological challenges are the same. But, the association between juvenile crime
and low education is found in every available study.
For juveniles aged 15-19, Levitt and Lochner (2001, Table 7.5) estimate the
individual determinants of violent and property crime using the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth from 1979 (NLSY79). They find a significant influence of education,
measured either as achievement or attainment. For males, a one quartile increase in
the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score reduces the probability of committing a
crime by 3-4 percent; and higher math scores reduce criminal activity, but English and
mechanical skills scores do not. Being a high school graduate by age 18 is associated
with reductions in property crime by 9%, violent crime by 17%, and drug-related crimes
by 10% (for minor property and minor violent crimes the association is negative but not
statistically significant). For females, the educational effects are generally negative but
not statistically significant because they commit so few crimes. 28 However, these
relationships are very likely to be understatements for any specific educational indicator

Using pooled 1960-1980 Census data, FBI data, and the NLSY79, Lochner and Moretti (2004) find a strongly negative effect of
high school graduation on criminal activity and incarceration. Belfield and Levin (2007a) use these estimates to calculate the
costs of crime by dropouts aged over 20. Other studies testing for graduation’s influence on adult crime report more
mixed/weaker results: graduation does not necessarily reduce all types of crime (Grogger, 1998; Witte, 1997). Williams and
Sickles (2002) find weak effects of high school graduation, but their models include graduation and years of schooling in the
same model, thus identifying a “sheepskin effect” rather than educational effect. Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Arum and
Beattie (1999) report strong correlations between low education and incarceration.
28 Indeed, almost no economic, family background, age or race effects are identifiable as independent determinants of female
criminal activity. Also, none of Lochner and Levitt’s specifications explain more than 10% of the variance in criminal activity.
27
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because they include multiple educational status measures in the same analyses (test
scores and graduation probabilities). 29
Merlo and Wolpin (2009) focus on the 1,163 Black male juveniles in the NLSY97,
i.e., youth who were aged 16-19 in 1996. Of those who were attending school at age
16, 18% have committed a crime, 12% have been arrested, and 4% are incarcerated at
the ages 19-22; of those not in school at age 16, the respective arrest, crime, and
incarceration figures are 31%, 27%, and 16%. Dividing the Black male population into
three groups based on risk factors related to being in school, working, and
arrest/incarceration rates, Merlo and Wolpin (2009) also find non-linear relationships.
They estimate that not being in school at age 16 (equivalent to not graduating),
significantly increases subsequent incarceration rates. For the most at-risk group, not
graduating raises the probability of being incarcerated between the ages 19-22 by 8.1
percentage points; for the middle group, not graduating raises the probability by 5.6
percentage points. These groups have incarceration probabilities of 39% and 58%
respectively over this brief three-year age span. 30
Critically, Sprott et al. (2005) find that stronger social bonds with school are
powerful in preventing delinquency for all children, and in fact are more powerful for
high-risk juveniles. Using longitudinal data on Canadian adolescents, they find that
strong school bonds reduce rates of violent and non-violent offending, and that the
impact is greater for juveniles with environmental factors that would predict a greater

Evidence from England also shows a strongly negative relationship between education and crime amongst juveniles born in
the 1980s (Sabates, 2008).
30 Within the juvenile justice system, educational status may also be influential. Using data from juvenile court referrals in
Maricopa County, Arizona, Rodriguez (2007) finds that 56% of juveniles attending school were detained compared to 69% of
juveniles not attending school.
29
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risk of offending. Thus, education may influence the commission of serious crimes as
well as minor offenses.
For juveniles, two studies have identified the straightforward impact of attending
school on the opportunity to commit crime. Notably, this impact seems to have
contrasting effects on property crime and violent crime: the former is reduced simply by
an ‘incapacitation effect’ of being in school; but the latter may be heightened because
school increases interactions between youth. Using teacher training days as times
when students would otherwise be in school, Jacob and Lefgren (2003) estimate that
extending the school year leads to a decrease in property crimes of 14%, but an
increase in violent crimes of 28%, for each extra day. Using teacher strikes as an
identifier, Luallen (2006) finds stronger effects related to the number of school days: per
strike day, property crime rises by 29% and juvenile crime falls by 31-36%. 31 However,
it is not clear how far these figures can be extrapolated across large numbers of extra
days in school.
Testing for education–crime causality is further complicated because of
simultaneity of being in school and committing crime. Poor educational performance
may cause juvenile crime, but the causality may be reversed. 32 Crime may cause low
attainment: the criminals may be stigmatized at school, may get placed in lower quality
schools or instructional programs, or may miss instructional time at school (either when
perpetrating crime or incarcerated). We found five studies that report a causal path
from juvenile crime to educational attainment. However, all these studies include prior
achievement as a control for initial juvenile crime.
31 On after school programs a report by Fight Crime: Invest in Kids (undated, p.51) asserts a 50% reduction in violent acts and
66% drop in vandalism and stealing. But the validity of these findings cannot be established.
32 Similarly, neighborhood characteristics may be strongly co-determined with crime and poor quality education (Aizer, 2008).
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Hjalmarsson (2008) estimates using the NLSY97 data source that: the average
graduation rate at age 19 is 67%; but for juveniles arrested (and/or charged) before age
16 it is 61%; for juveniles arrested, charged and convicted, it is 57%; and juveniles
arrested, charged, convicted, and incarcerated, it is 49%. 33 But these estimates control
for prior achievement tests (as well as ‘risky behaviors’). Similarly, Sweeten (2006)
uses the NLSY97 and finds that a first-time arrest during high school almost doubles the
odds of failing to graduate. Here too, Sweeten (2006) reports that prior academic test
scores strongly predict both criminal activity and graduation. Using data from the school
system in Georgia, McGarvey et al. (2008) find a strong association between school
violent crimes and test scores: earlier test scores predict levels of violent crime; and
violent crime predicts later test scores. Using longitudinal data on a sample of 529 atrisk adolescents (ages 13-22) in New York state, Bernburg and Krohn (2003) find that
police and juvenile justice interventions—even after controlling for delinquent
behavior— significantly reduce the probability of high school graduation. But, education
appears to reduce the severity of the required intervention, and dropping out of high
school raises (the issue of) non-employment during young adulthood (ages 19-22),
which in turn is found to increase criminal activity. Lastly, Hannon (2003) uses the
NLSY79 to correlate numbers of charges/arrests and delinquent behavior against the
probability of dropping out. Both variables are strong influences on the probability of
dropping out, but Hannon’s regression specifications also control for educational
aspirations and academic aptitude.

The graduation rate reported by the BLS from the NLSY97 at age 19 is higher at 77%. But it presumably includes all
respondents unadjusted for item response rates (http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy97.htm).
33
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Finally, simple tabulations of the education levels of incarcerated juveniles is
suggestive of the importance of education. Based on an educational survey performed
in Los Angeles (LA) County, approximately 15-20% of youth who enter juvenile halls,
probation camps and community day schools are classified as requiring special
education services. Of the remaining youth in custody, the average reading and math
levels are equivalent to fifth- to sixth grade. Across the state in 2003-04, 75% of
students passed the high school exit exam; in LA County, the pass rate was 70%; but
for students in LA County juvenile hall or community day school, the pass rate was 26%
(LA CCPC, 2006).
In summary, it is sensible to assume that poor achievement, juvenile crime, and
high school failure are co-determined. At one level, our cost calculations can be
regarded as estimates of the ‘overall’ loss associated with juveniles who are dropouts.
More compellingly, our cost calculations can be applied to educational interventions
which have been established to reduce crime (see Section 6 below).

5. The Economic Losses from Low Educational Status
5.1 Juvenile Crime Economic Losses
Clearly, there are several different metrics for calibrating the education–crime
relationship. Hence, there are several ways to express and calculate the fiscal and
social economic losses imposed by juvenile crime and the high number of dropouts in
California.
We apply three metrics, based on the results given in Levitt and Lochner (2001),
Merlo and Wolpin (2009), and Sweeten (2006). Because of the way in which the results
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are reported, we are not able to derive an equivalent metric for the study by
Hjalmarsson (2008). From each study, we calculate the extent to which juvenile crime
would be lower if a high school dropout became a high school graduate. We then
calculate the value of that switch in status using our crime cost estimates summarized in
Table 6. The three metrics are calculated assuming a high school dropout rate of 23%
for males and 20% for females in California (see above); these rates mean 123,800
dropouts each year and a projected 819,500 dropouts in a juvenile cohort aged 12-17.
No adjustments for the racial composition of juvenile crime and low education are
applied; these compositional effects are already reflected in the results of each study.
For each estimate we also report the one standard deviation confidence interval, also
using the range of costs derived above. To get an overall single-value estimate, we
take the average across the three studies.
Using Levitt and Lochner (2001), we estimate that each new high school
graduate would have a crime rate 17% lower for violent crimes and 10% lower for all
other crimes. This impact only occurs for males, although they are responsible for the
majority of all crimes. Based on proportions from Sweeten (2006), the average male
dropout causes an economic crime loss of $6,730. Therefore, a 17% and 10%
reduction in violent and other crimes if the dropout became a graduate would mean a
saving per additional high school graduate of $960. 34 Across all 417,940 male
dropouts, the total economic loss associated with low education is therefore $399
million (= $960 * 417,940).

This is calculated as follows: of the $4,140 total, 60% is from violent crime and 40% from all other crimes. Thus, the savings
across all crime is $590 (= $4,140 * 0.6 * 0.17 + $4,140 * 0.4 * 0.10).
34
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Using the Merlo and Wolpin (2009) relationship, high school dropouts cause 34%
of all crimes despite being only 23% of the population, thus, they are responsible for
34% of all costs (i.e., $3.01 billion), which amounts to $3,670 per person. In contrast,
high school graduates commit only 66% of all crimes but are 77% of the population.
The economic loss per graduate amounts to $2,040 per person. Therefore, each high
school graduate saves $1,630 ($3,670-$2,040) over a dropout in juvenile crime costs.
Across a single juvenile cohort of 819,500 persons in California, the present value
economic loss at age 12 associated with low education is $1.33 billion.
Finally, Sweeten (2006) estimates that criminal activity of high school dropouts is
twice as high as that of graduates. This yields a very similar estimate to the previous
one: high school dropouts are responsible for 37% of juvenile crime (despite being only
23% of the population), and this yields a juvenile crime cost per dropout of $4,040. 35 In
contrast, high school graduates (and those with more education) are responsible for
63% of all crimes despite being are 77% of the population; the unit ‘cost’ is $2,020 and
this is the saving per graduate. Across the entire juvenile cohort, the total juvenile crime
loss from low education is $1.66 billion.
These estimates of the economic losses of juvenile crime arising from low
education are summarized in Table 7. 36 These show the reduction in the economic
burden if the dropout rate in California fell by a set percent. So, a 100% fall would mean
that there are no dropouts. Although implausible, this figure gives the total juvenile
crime loss from low education; across the three studies it ranges from $399 million to

35 Implicit in this calculation is that dropouts commit the same types of crimes as graduates, but just commit more of them. It is
possible that dropouts commit more serious crimes, such as violent assault, in which case our estimates of the economic loss
are biased downward.
36 To repeat, this loss is the entire juvenile criminal activity of dropouts even before they have dropped out of school.
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$1.66 billion with an average of $1.13 billion and confidence interval of +/-$170 million.
This represents about 13% of the $8.85 billion in total economic losses from juvenile
crime (Table 5) and corresponds to almost 60,000 of an estimated 467,116 juvenile
crimes committed in 2007 (233,558 crimes reported Table 1 times an assumed average
offense multiple of two based on figures from Table 4). From an educational reform
perspective, a more appropriate number might be a 20% fall in the dropout rate (from
23% to 18%). Based on the three estimates, the economic savings from such a reform
across a juvenile cohort are between $100 million and $330 million: the average across
the three estimates is $230 million with a confidence interval of +/-$40 million. Other
sized reductions (e.g. 10% or 50%) are also shown in Table 7.
Note that these are annual figures for the cohort of persons aged between 12
and 17. Obviously, each year there is another cohort of persons aged between 12 and
17. So, from the perspective of California, the figures in Table 7 should be thought of as
annual amounts. Using the perspective of a juvenile, the figures in Table 7 are the full
loss incurred over the six juvenile years.
5.2 Adult Crime Economic Losses
We should also add to the costs of juvenile crime the consequential impact of
associated costs of crime during adulthood.
In total, there are 1.2 million property crimes in California each year, as well as
high numbers of larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, burglary, and property crime. Per
100,000 persons in the state, there are 526 violent crimes, over 1,920 property crimes,
7 murders, and 26 rapes per year (these are reflected in the proportions of non-juvenile
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crime in Table 1). As with juveniles, dropouts commit a disproportionate fraction of
adult crime.
Here, we draw on our earlier estimates of the economic losses associated with
low education for California (Belfield and Levin, 2007a). These earlier estimates
calculated the present value loss associated with higher crime per high school dropout
over the lifetime, but starting at age 20. We modify these estimates in two ways. First,
we include criminal activity at ages 18-19 based on a backward extrapolation that
adjusts for the relative incidence of crime at that age (i.e., we predict age-19 crime as
age-20 crime plus the difference between age-20 and age-21 crime). Second, we
report present values at age 12 (all figures are in 2008 dollars).
Table 8 reports the estimates for adult crime of the loss associated with low
education. The total fiscal cost of crime associated with low education is substantial. 37
Expressed as the present value difference between the adult crime costs of a dropout
as against a high school graduate, the fiscal loss associated with low education is
$24,030 ($39,270 for males and $8,800 for females). The social loss is even larger, at
$60,080 per dropout ($98,160 for males and $22,000 for females). In total, the present
value lifetime loss from adult crime aged 18 onward per dropout is $84,110 ($137,430
for males and $30,790 for females). This amount should be added to the juvenile crime
costs to get a full life-course loss from crime by high school dropouts.
37 The method used to calculate these costs is reported in full in Belfield and Levin (2007a) although it follows a similar protocol
to that undertaken above. Separate costs per arrest and per crime are calculated for the five types of crime. Crime is assumed
to decay with age. Costs include policing, trials and sentencing, and incarceration and costs to the government in payments to
victims, based on the National Crime Victimization Survey; costs estimated by Cohen (2005) of payments from the Crime Victims
Fund; costs to federal agencies committed to reducing crime (notably for the “war on drugs”); and costs estimated by MacMillan
(2000) on the annual loss of tax revenues because victims are unable to work. Both federal and state costs are included. The
fiscal cost of this criminal activity is $22 billion annually in policing and judiciary expenditures, as well as $9.3 billion in corrections
expenditures (see Table 2). Social costs are estimated at 2.5 times the fiscal costs, based on a conservative ratio detailed in
Belfield and Levin (2007a). The costs reported in Belfield and Levin (2007a) cannot easily be compared to those reported here:
the latter are in 2008 dollars, present values aged 12, and include crime committed at ages 18-19.
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Table 9 summarizes the economic loss from dropouts. The Table includes the
loss from juvenile crime, adult crime, and all the other associated impacts from low
education. These other impacts are detailed in full in Belfield and Levin (2007a) and
include: lower earnings and tax payments associated with low education; higher welfare
payments; increased payments for government-run health programs; and positive
externalities from having an educated workforce.
To simplify the exposition and make sure we are adding up figures that
correspond to each other, we look at the single-age cohort of children currently aged 12
in 2009 in California. 38 This single-age cohort group includes 136,000 dropouts, with an
economic loss in terms of additional juvenile and adult crime over their high school
graduate classmates. All these dropouts will impose a juvenile crime loss of $1.13
billion and an adult crime loss of $10.5 billion (figures in present values at age 12). The
loss from juvenile crime is approximately one-tenth of the total loss as a result of low
education; however, much of adult crime is committed by persons who began their
criminal activities during their juvenile years. As such, a significantly high proportion of
adult crime may be interpreted as ‘induced’ by juvenile criminal behavior. Moreover, as
noted above, the juvenile years are only from ages 12-17, but the adult years are ages
18 and above, i.e., approximately 8 times as long. In addition, there are substantial
other losses associated with low education: for this single age cohort, these amount to
$34.51 billion. Therefore, in total, the economic loss associated with having any high
school dropouts in California is $46.15 billion. This is a present value amount spread
over the lifetime of a single cohort. Of course, each year there is a new cohort of
dropouts, so the total is best interpreted as an annual loss.
38

As described above, a juvenile cohort is all persons aged 12-17.
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6. Policy Responses to Juvenile Crime
Clearly, the relationship between juvenile crime and education is strong and
economically meaningful. Therefore, it may be appropriate to invest in educational
programs to alleviate this burden. Here, simple calculations of the costs of investments
in education are compared to the losses associated with juvenile crime. 39
Overall, there is a strong case for simply raising the quality of schooling that
many students receive: that will reduce the dropout rate and so reduce the crime rate.
In an earlier study, we identified five approaches with compelling evidence that
they would raise the high school graduation rate: raising teachers’ salaries; reducing
class size (targeted or population-wide); a whole-school reform at the high school level;
and two pre-school programs. We also identified eight approaches that had promising
evidence. We can compare the costs of these programs with their likely savings solely
from lower rates of juvenile crime, i.e., excluding other benefits such as income or
health gains.
Table 10 briefly describes each effective intervention and reports its cost per
yield of one additional high school graduate (present values at age 12 using 3.5%
discount rate, 2008 dollars). 40 The second column shows the percentage of these costs

39 We do not consider whether improving education is more cost-effective than crime prevention or rehabilitation strategies or
reforms to the criminal justice system. The effectiveness of crime prevention depends on the specifics of the program. Worrall
(2004) finds no effect on juvenile arrests from the $50 million in Challenge Grants allocated in California in 1996. Caldwell et al.
(2006) estimate a 6-to-1 benefit-cost ratio from an intensive treatment program delivered to incarcerated delinquent boys. Fass
and Pi (2002) calculate that, although more punitive juvenile justice does reduce crime in Texas, the costs of implementation
significantly outweigh the benefits. Lastly, Cuellar et al. (2006) report on an effective mental health intervention for juvenile
offenders in Texas; they estimate it reduced re-arrests within one year from 1.54 for the comparison group to 0.86 for the
treatment group. However, no cost information is reported on the program. The costs and benefits of judicial and systemic
reforms are reviewed in Butts and Roman (2009).
40 These cost estimates are from our prior work (Belfield and Levin, 2007b, Table 1), although in that paper we expressed them
as present values at age 20. We have also estimated the economic gains from raising math achievement (Belfield and Levin,
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that would be offset by lower rates of juvenile crime. The percentage savings range
from 8% to 24% for the five compelling interventions, with an average of 16%. The
range is 5% to 62% for the interventions with some promise. Interventions that are
implemented at the high school level (such as First Things First) cannot reduce juvenile
crime until high school, and so appear less cost-effective.
The final column of Table 10 compares the cost to yield one extra graduate with
the total benefits from one additional graduate. The total benefits amount is derived
from Table 9, and so includes the economic consequences of juvenile crime, adult
crime, and all the other impacts of education. These figures are illustrative, because
they do not adjust for the time periods over which each intervention might be
implemented. However, they are striking in that in all cases the benefit-cost ratios are
significantly greater than 1.
Although expressed in present values, these education reforms would only pay
off when youth reach the ages at which they would be likely to commit such crimes. In
the case of pre-school programs, that would not be for ten years; for middle school and
high school reforms the effects would be more immediate. But of course the benefits of
graduating from high school extend much more broadly than reductions in juvenile
crime. There are many other income and health benefits that need to be included in a
full benefit-cost analysis of dropping out. From our earlier analysis, we estimate the
lifetime PV benefits from age 20 at $42,300 to California’s state and local governments;
the social PV benefits from age 20 onward are $309,600 (present values at age 12 in

2009), as has Goodman (2008). An alternative metric is staying on track in terms of passing high school courses (Allensworth
and Easton, 2007). However, these math gains (and ‘staying on track’ rates) are not easily amenable to interpretation in terms of
graduation rate changes and costs per student. As noted above, we are skeptical that raising the numbers of GED-recipients will
be equally effective even though it will technically reduce the dropout rate.
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2008 dollars, adjusted from Belfield and Levin, 2007a). Although not large in relative
terms, therefore, the savings from reductions in juvenile crime—at approximately $8,700
per new graduate over the entire juvenile period— are not trivial. From a policy
perspective it is useful to note that the savings from reduced juvenile crime are quickly
realized, and so are less sensitive to the discount rate used to report cost-benefit totals.
Straightforwardly, adding in these juvenile crime savings will raise the benefit–cost
ratios for education reforms, giving further confirmation that these reforms have a high
rate of return.
More directly, schools may combat crime by delivering educationally-based crime
prevention programs. These prevention programs may then have a joint effect in
raising achievement and reducing crime (Greenwood, 2008; Aos et al., 2006). It is
instructive to see how much these programs cost and set this cost against the
calculations of the losses associated with juvenile crime.
The most direct method for intervening is through school-based violence
prevention programs. Although there is evidence that these are effective (Gottfredson
et al. 2005), there are few well-established programs with prescribed inputs such that
cost calculations are permissible. Based on evidence on effectiveness reviewed in the
Colorado Blueprints series (Drake, 2007), two programs for middle and high school
students may be feasible: Functional Family Therapy, which is a family-based
intervention with therapists and 12 visits over a 90-day period to reduce risk factors; and
Aggression Replacement Training (ART), which is for youth who are likely to re-offend
and may lack pro-social skills, and includes guided group discussions over a 10-week,
30-hour program for small groups of juvenile offenders. Adjusted for California prices,
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and taking the average cost, the estimated per student cost for an effective violence
prevention program is $2,800. 41 Also, for elementary school students, the PATHS
(Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies) Curriculum, which is intended to promote
emotional and social competencies and reduce aggression and behavior problems, may
be appropriate (Greenberg et al., 1998). Adjusted for California prices, the estimated
costs for the PATHS curriculum materials are $200 per elementary student. These cost
figures compare favorably with the annual loss from juvenile crime; when they are
compared to the lifetime economic loss imposed by a chronic juvenile offender, they are
likely to yield a significantly positive rate of return.
Intensive early education programs may reduce juvenile crime. Reynolds et al.
(2002) found that participants in the Chicago Child-Parent Centers program had been
arrested 0.47 times before age 18; the comparison group students had arrest rates of
0.67. This 29% fall in juvenile criminal activity would translate into savings of at least
$3,420 if the program were provided to all young children (present value at age 5, 3.5%
discount rate, 2008 dollars). If the Chicago program were delivered to students with a
higher tendency to commit crime (our category of offenders), the savings would rise to
$14,250. Both figures compare favorably with the estimated costs of the program at
$8,100 per participant. Similar results are found for the High/Scope Perry pre-school
program, as Nores et al. (2006) report significantly lower criminal activity over the lifecourse by participants, relative to a control group.
Finally, longer school days and after-school programs may be effective, even
simply through requiring students to spend more time in school and less time out of it.
The estimates from Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006) reviewed above
41

This figure can be compared to the present values at age 12 if the program is delivered at that age.
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suggest adding three days to the school calendar, i.e., increasing student hours in
school by 1.66%. With constant economies of scale and per pupil spending of $9,600 in
California, expenditures would therefore rise by $180 per student. More plausibly,
economies of scale in terms of a few extra hours of school per student will be constant,
but they would have to be very strongly decreasing to reach even $800 or $1,000 in
additional costs. Hence, purely as a juvenile crime prevention program, longer school
hours may be cost-effective. However, the effects on achievement and attendance
would need to be explicitly modeled; these may be positive or negative.
Moreover, both educational investments and crime prevention interventions can
be targeted. Nationally, Balfanz and Letgers (2004) have identified ‘dropout factories’,
i.e., high schools with very high dropout rates. And the targeting can be further refined
by including local demographic conditions in California, as per the analysis by
Rumberger and Arellano (2007). Such targeting might also reduce the costs of
interventions by concentrating it in those populations where it is likely to be most
effective.

7. Conclusions
Juvenile crime is significant, both economically and socially. Each cohort of juveniles
imposes a social loss of $8.9 billion annually and even this figure is likely to be an
understatement. The full economic implications of juvenile crime are hard to quantify: it
affects many domains of life and absorbs resources from multiple levels of government
and public and private agencies (there are also large gaps in the data, both on the crime
side and on the costs side). Policy solutions are therefore hard to devise and
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implement. Yet, there is compelling evidence that raising the high school graduation
rate would reduce the juvenile crime rate, and there is research evidence on effective
strategies to raise graduation rates. If these are implemented, there are likely to be
substantial economic savings: we calculate that $1.1 billion of the costs of juvenile crime
are a result of having large numbers of high school dropouts. Furthermore, given the
economic losses associated with juvenile crime, a number of educationally-based crime
prevention programs should pass a cost-benefit test. If these educational investments
or prevention programs are targeted at chronic offenders or those most at-risk, the
presumption of benefits exceeding costs is even stronger. When we take account of the
life-course patterns of crime and the rate of growth of expenditures on crime, policy
solutions become more urgent still.
Finally, we should note public preferences for investing in improved education
over spending on the criminal justice system. Simply, citizens would prefer to spend tax
dollars on education (and or juvenile crime prevention) than on a juvenile justice and
incarceration system (Nagin et al., 2006). Our economic calculations—substantial in
themselves—do not take into account the extent to which the public regards poor quality
education as a lost opportunity to alleviate juvenile crime.
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Table 1
Juvenile arrests and percent of all arrests in California (2007)
(1)
Total arrests of
persons aged
under 18
Total1
Violent crime2
Property crime3
Curfew and loitering law violations
Runaways
Disorderly conduct
Arson
Vandalism
Robbery
Larceny-theft
Burglary
Weapons; carrying, possessing, etc.
Liquor laws
Other assaults
Motor vehicle theft
Stolen property; buying, receiving, possessing
Sex offenses (except forcible rape and
All other offenses (except traffic)
Murder and non-negligent manslaughter
Forcible rape
Gambling
Aggravated assault
Embezzlement
Drug abuse violations
Vagrancy
Fraud
Prostitution and commercialized vice
Drunkenness
Forgery and counterfeiting
Offenses against the family and children
Driving under the influence

(2)
Aged under 18
% of all arrests

233,558
17,416
45,662

15%
14%
28%

21,126
4,189
11,835
860
16,887
6,721
26,331
13,908
8,597
5,579
22,086
4,563
3,301
2,256
2,118
235
239
78
10,221
184
22,047
310
597
584
4,638
320
12
1,626

100%
100%
71%
56%
49%
32%
30%
26%
26%
26%
25%
20%
17%
15%
13%
12%
11%
11%
10%
8%
8%
8%
6%
5%
4%
3%
3%
1%

Source: FBI, UCR 2007, Table 69. Notes: 1 Does not include traffic arrests. 2 Violent crimes are offenses of
3
murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes are
offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
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Table 2
Expenditures by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Fiscal Year, 2007)
Program

Expenditure ($ millions)

Juvenile Operations
Juvenile Education, Vocations, and Offender
Program
Juvenile Paroles
Juvenile Healthcare
Juvenile total:

$208
$178
$37
$100
$523

Adult Corrections and Rehabilitation Operations
Correctional Health Care Services
Parole Operations and Board of Parole Hearings Adult
Education, Vocations and Offender Programs - Adult
Administration / unallocated / other
Corrections Standards Authority

$5,293
$1,787
$918

Total:

$9,777

Source: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
www.cdcr.ca.gov/Budget/Budget_Overview.html

47

$457
$450
$351

Table 3
CJS and Incarceration Costs from Juvenile Crime in California (2007)
Component

Expenditure ($ millions)

Current estimates:
State-level policing and CJS
County-level policing and CJS
Incarceration
Total

$1,800
$810
$523
$3,133

Alternative estimates:
Fellmeth (2005) adjusted with incarceration:
Fass and Pi (2002) adjusted with incarceration:
Miller et al. (2001) adjusted for all felony offenses

$2,723
$1,603
$1,070

Sources: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
ww.cdcr.ca.gov/Budget/Budget_Overview.html. Calculations by authors.
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Table 4
Total Costs to Victims from Juvenile Crimes in California (2007)

Curfew and loitering law violationsab
Runawaysab
Disorderly conductab
Arson
Vandalisma
Robbery
Larceny-theftb
Burglary
Weapons; carrying, possessing, etc.ab
Liquor lawsab
Other assaults
Motor vehicle theft
Stolen property; buying, receiving
ab
Sex offenses (excl. forcible rape,
All other offenses (except traffic)ab
Murder and nonnegligent
Forcible rape
Gamblingab
Aggravated assault
Embezzlementab
Drug abuse violationsab
Vagrancyab
Fraudab
Prostitution and commercialized viceb
Drunkennessab
Forgery and counterfeitingab
Offenses against the family and
b
Driving under the influenceb

(1)
Offense
multipl
e

(2)
Victim
costs per
crime

2
2
2
2.85
2.05
1.4
2.9
1
2
2
2.85
1.475
2
2.85
2
1
2.85
2
2.85
2
2
2
2.9
2
2
2
2
2

$3,412
$3,412
$3,412
$63,966
$3,412
$13,646
$631
$2,388
$3,412
$3,412
$16,034
$6,311
$3,412
$114,285
$3,412
$5,014,91
$148,400
$3,412
$40,938
$3,412
$3,412
$3,412
$3,412
$148,400
$3,412
$3,412
$56,290
$30,704

Total

(3)
Total victim
costs
($ millions)
136
27
76
148
111
121
45
31
55
36
952
40
21
693
14
1112
95
1
1,125
1
142
2
6
164
30
2
1
94
$5,282

Notes: Offense multiples adjusted from Farrington et al. (2003) bounded at 1; crimes denoted b are from ‘other
crime type’. Victim costs per crime adjusted to California prices from Miller et al. (1996); crimes denoted a are
assumed to cost that of robbery with no injury. Column 3 calculated as product of columns (1), (2) and column
(1) from Table 1. CPI adjustment of inflation (49%). California cost-of-living adjustment (8%). Figures expressed
in 2008 dollars.
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Table 5
Total Economic Losses from Juvenile Crime in California (2007, $ millions)
CJS plus
incarceration

Victim Costs

School-site
costs

Total

Baseline

$3,130

$5,280

$450

$8,850

47 sensitivity tests:
Average
Standard deviation

$2,130

$4,580

$800

$7,510
$1,380

Notes: CJS plus incarceration costs from Table 3. Victim costs from Table 4. Sensitivity tests: Victim costs:
Assume crimes denoted a incur 50% lower costs; Victim costs: Assume crimes denoted b have offense multiple
of 3; Victim costs: Apply offense multiples one-quarter of those in Farrington et al. (2003) directly; fiscal costs
from range given in Table 3; school-site costs based on upper bound estimates by Rothstein (1995) and Belfield
and Schwartz (2006); estimate only 25% of schools pay compensating wage differential. Figures in 2008 dollars
rounded to nearest $10 million.
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Table 6
Per Youth Economic Loss from Juvenile Crime in California (2008)
Average per youth

Average per
offender

Average per
chronic offender

Overall mean
(Range)

$2,480
($2100-$2870)

$10,350
($8740-$11970)

$62,110
($52430-$71790)

Male
(Range)

$4,140
($3500-$4790)

$17,250
($14560-$19940)

$103,520
($87380-$119660)

Female
(Range)

$760
($640-$880)

$3170
($2700-$3660)

$19,010
($16050-$21980)

Overall mean
(Range)

$14,680
($12390-$16970)

$61,160
($51620-$70690)

$366,940
($309740-$424150)

Male
(Range)

$24,460
($20650-$28280)

$101,930
($86040-$117820)

$611,570
($516230-$706910)

Female
(Range)

$4,490
($3800-$5200)

$18,720
($15800-$21640)

$112,330
($94820-$129840)

Annual amount:

Present value at
age 12 across all
juvenile years:

Notes: Total economic loss from Table 5, column 4. Assumes zero crime until age 12. Offenders assumed to be
12% of all juveniles; chronic offenders 2% of all juveniles. Males assumed to commit 85% of offenses. Juvenile
span is ages 12 through 17. Range is plus and minus one standard deviation in costs. Present values are
expressed at age 12 using a 3.5% discount rate. Figures in 2008 dollars rounded to nearest $10.
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Table 7
Economic Losses from Juvenile Crime From Low Education in California (2008)
Economic Loss from Juvenile Crime per Cohort
($ millions)
Method (a)

Method (b)

Method (c)

Average of
Methods (a)(c)

$399

$1,655
($1,400$1,910)

$1,129

($230-$380)

$1,334
($1,130$1,540)

($960-$1,300)

50%
(Range)

$200
($180-$220)

$667
($560-$770)

$827
($700-$960)

$565
($510-$650)

20%
(Range)

$100
($80-$120)

$267
($230-$310)

$331
($280-$380)

$226
($190-$260)

10%
(Range)

$50
($40-$60)

$133
($110-$150)

$165
($140-$190)

$113
($100-$140)

Fall in dropout
rate:
100%
(Range)

Notes: Method (a) adapts estimates from Levitt and Lochner (2001); Method (b) adapts estimates from Merlo
and Wolpin (2009); and Method (c) adapts estimates from Sweeten (2006). Range is plus and minus one
standard deviation of cost estimates, rounded to nearest $10 m. Figures in 2008 dollars.
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Table 8
Economic Losses from Adult Crime From Low Education in California (2008)
Present Value Economic Loss from Adult Crime per Dropout

Average
Male
Female

Fiscal loss

Social loss

Total loss

$24,030

$60,080

$84,110

$39,270
$8,800

$98,160
$22,000

$137,430
$30,790

Notes: Present value at age 12 using discount rate of 3.5%. Figures in 2008 dollars.
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Table 9
Economic Losses from Juvenile Crime and Adult Crime From Low Education in California

Present Value at age 12 for the cohort of 12-year-olds in 2009
($ millions)
Juvenile Crime
Adult Crime
All Other
Total
Benefits
Fall in
dropout rate:
$1,130

$10,510

$34,510

$46,150

50%

$570

$5,260

$17,250

$23,080

20%

$230

$2,100

$6,900

$9,230

10%

$110

$1,050

$3,450

$4,620

100%

Notes: Juvenile crime figures from Table 7, column 5. Adult crime figures from Table 8 times number of dropouts
each year. All other benefits from Belfield and Levin (2007a, Table 18): these are monetized gains from
additional income and health, as well as positive externalities from a more productive workforce and lower
welfare payments. Present values are expressed at age 12 using a 3.5% discount rate. Figures in 2008 dollars
rounded to nearest $10.
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Table 10
Possible Interventions to Raise the Rate of High School Graduation in California
Costs per
additional
graduate

Interventions demonstrated to
raise the graduation rate:
Chicago-Child Parent
CPC
Center program
Increasing teacher
TSI
salaries by 10% for the
K-12 years
High/Scope Perry PrePPP
school Program
First Things First high
FTF
school reform
Reducing class sizes in
CSR minorities elementary school for
minority students only
(Project STAR)
Reducing class sizes in
CSR –
population elementary school for
all students (Project
STAR)
Interventions with some promise
to raise the graduation rate:
Talent Search
TAS
Career academies for
CAC
high school students
Summer school
SUM
Check & Connect high
C&C
school reform
Achievement for
ALAS
Latinos through
Academic Success
Twelve Together
12T
Success for All school
SFA
reform
I Have A Dream
IHD
program

Percent of
intervention
costs offset
by savings in
juvenile
crime

Ratio of costs
to total
benefits

$36,940

24%

7.47

$50,150

17%

$56,880

15%

4.85

$29,720

15%

9.30

$62,920

14%

4.39

$102,970

8%

$6,990

62%

39.51

$14,290
$26,810

30%
22%

19.32
10.30

$23,860

18%

11.57

$50,300
$64,140

9%
7%

$136,310

6%

$159,930

5%

5.51

2.68

5.49
4.30
2.02
1.73

Notes: For details on each program, see Belfield and Levin (2007b). Juvenile crime savings per graduate $8,700
for reforms before high school; $4,350 for reforms during high school (using Method (b)). Costs per additional
graduate are present values at age 12. Present values expressed using a discount rate of 3.5%. 2008 dollars
rounded to nearest $10.
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